Drug Homicide In
Colorado
In an effort to combat the rising tide of fatalities, many states have implemented Drug Induced Homicide laws to hold drug dealers accountable for the deaths.
Fortunately, Colorado is one of those states. The following is an excerpt from Colorado State Law:
(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if:
(a) After deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of another person; or
(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault as prohibited by section 18-3-402, sexual assault in the first or second degree as prohibited by section 18-3-402 or 18-3-403 as those sections existed prior to July 1, 2000, or a class 3 felony for sexual assault on a child as provided in section 18-3-405 (2), or the crime of escape as provided in section 18-8-208, and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone; or
(c) By perjury or subornation of perjury he procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person; or
(d) Under circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another; or
(e) He or she commits unlawful distribution, dispensation, or sale of a controlled substance to a person under the age of eighteen years on school grounds as provided in section 18-18-407 (2), and the death of such person is caused by the use of such controlled substance; or
(f) The person knowingly causes the death of a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age and the person committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the victim.
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1)(b) of this section that the defendant:
(a) Was not the only participant in the underlying crime; and
(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(c) Was not armed with a deadly weapon; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and
(e) Did not engage himself in or intend to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury; and
(f) Endeavored to disengage himself from the commission of the underlying crime or flight therefrom immediately upon having reasonable grounds to believe that another participant is armed with a deadly weapon, instrument, article, or substance, or intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.
(3) Murder in the first degree is a class 1 felony.
(4) The statutory privilege between patient and physician and between husband and wife shall not be available for excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution for the crime of murder in the first degree as described in paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of this section.
(1) (a) (I) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed after July 1, 1979, and before July 1, 1984, felonies are divided into five classes which are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties which are authorized upon conviction:
Class | Presumptive Range
1 | Life imprisonment or death
2 | Eight to twelve years plus one year of parole
3 | Four to eight years plus one year of parole
4 | Two to four years plus one year of parole
5 | One to two years plus one year of parole
(II) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1984, and before July 1, 1985, felonies are divided into five classes which are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties which are authorized upon conviction:
Class | Presumptive Range
1 | Life imprisonment or death
2 | Eight to twelve years
3 | Four to eight years
4 | Two to four years
5 | One to two years
(III) (A) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(a)(III)(E) or (1)(a)(III)(F) of this section, in addition to, or in lieu of, any sentence to imprisonment, probation, community corrections, or work release, a fine within the following presumptive ranges may be imposed for the specified classes of felonies:
Class | Minimum Sentence | Maximum Sentence
1 | No fine | No fine
2 | Five thousand dollars | One million dollars
3 | Three thousand dollars | Seven hundred fifty thousand dollars
4 | Two thousand dollars | Five hundred thousand dollars
5 | One thousand dollars | One hundred thousand dollars
6 | One thousand dollars | One hundred thousand dollars
(A.5) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person who attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or commits against an elderly person any felony set forth in part 4 of article 4 of this title, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 of article 5 of this title, article 5.5 of this title, or section 11-51-603, C.R.S., shall be required to pay a mandatory and substantial fine within the limits permitted by law. However, all moneys collected from the offender shall be applied in the following order: Costs for crime victim compensation fund pursuant to section 24-4.1-119, C.R.S.; surcharges for victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund pursuant to section 24-4.2-104, C.R.S.; restitution; time payment fee; late fees; and any other fines, fees, or surcharges. For purposes of this sub-subparagraph (A.5), an “elderly person” or “elderly victim” means a person sixty years of age or older.
(B) Failure to pay a fine imposed pursuant to this subparagraph (III) is grounds for revocation of probation or revocation of a sentence to community corrections, assuming the defendant’s ability to pay. If such a revocation occurs, the court may impose the maximum sentence allowable in the given sentencing ranges.
(C) Each judicial district shall have at least one clerk who shall collect and administer the fines imposed under this subparagraph (III) and under section 18-1.3-501 in accordance with the provisions of sub-subparagraph (D) of this subparagraph (III).
(D) All fines collected pursuant to this subparagraph (III) shall be deposited in the fines collection cash fund, which fund is hereby created. The general assembly shall make annual appropriations out of such fund for administrative and personnel costs incurred in the collection and administration of said fines. All unexpended balances shall revert to the general fund at the end of each fiscal year.
(E) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (III), a person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced shall not be eligible to receive a fine in lieu of any sentence to imprisonment, community corrections, or work release but shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentence specified in subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (a) and may receive a fine in addition to said sentence.
(F) On and after June 6, 2018, if a person is convicted of second degree burglary as described in section 18-4-203 (2)(c), in addition to any other sentence, the court may require the person to pay a fine of at least five thousand dollars but not exceeding seven hundred fifty thousand dollars.
(IV) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, but prior to July 1, 1993, felonies are divided into six classes which are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties which are authorized upon conviction:
Class | Minimum Sentence | Maximum Sentence
1 | Life imprisonment | Death
2 | Eight years imprisonment | Twenty-four years imprisonment
3 | Four years imprisonment | Sixteen years imprisonment
4 | Two years imprisonment | Eight years imprisonment
5 | One year imprisonment | Four years imprisonment
6 | One year imprisonment | Two years imprisonment
(V) (A) Except as otherwise provided in section 18-1.3-401.5 for offenses contained in article 18 of this title 18 committed on or after October 1, 2013, as to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, and before July 1, 2018, felonies are divided into six classes that are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties that are authorized upon conviction:
Class | Minimum Sentence | MaximumSentence | Mandatory Period of Parole
1 | Life imprisonment | Death | None
2 Eight years imprisonment | Twenty-four years imprisonment | Five years imprisonment
3 | Four years imprisonment | Twelve years imprisonment | Five years imprisonment
4 Two years imprisonment | Six years imprisonment | Three years imprisonment
5 One year imprisonment | Three years imprisonment | Two years imprisonment
6 One year imprisonment | Eighteen months imprisonment | One year imprisonment
(A.1) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 2018, felonies are divided into six classes that are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties that are authorized upon conviction:
Class | Minimum Sentence | Maximum Sentence | Mandatory Period of Parole
1 | Life imprisonment | Death | None
2 | Eight years imprisonment | Twenty-four years imprisonment | Five years if the offense is a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 (2). Three years if the offense is not a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 (2)
3 | Four years imprisonment | Twelve years imprisonment | Three years imprisonment
4 | Two years imprisonment | Six years imprisonment | Three years imprisonment
5 | One year imprisonment | Three years imprisonment | Two years
6 | One year imprisonment | Eighteen months imprisonment | One year imprisonment
(B) Any person who is paroled pursuant to section 17-22.5-403, or any person who is not paroled and is discharged pursuant to law, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole established pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section. Such mandatory period of parole may not be waived by the offender or waived or suspended by the court and shall be subject to the provisions of section 17-22.5-403 (6), which permits the state board of parole to discharge the offender at any time during the term of parole upon a determination that the offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated and reintegrated into society and can no longer benefit from parole supervision.
(C) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, the mandatory period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed prior to July 1, 1996, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title 18, or part 3 of article 6 of this title 18, shall be five years. Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, and except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(a)(V)(C.5) of this section, the period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed on or after July 1, 1996, but prior to July 1, 2002, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be set by the state board of parole pursuant to section 17-2-201 (5)(a.5), but in no event shall the term of parole exceed the maximum sentence imposed upon the inmate by the court.
(C.3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2002, p. 124, 1, effective March 26, 2002.)
(C.5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, any person sentenced for a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5), committed on or after November 1, 1998, shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of this article 1.3.
(C.7) Any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 2002, involving unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), or for a felony, committed on or after July 1, 2002, the underlying factual basis of which involved unlawful sexual behavior, and who is not subject to the provisions of part 10 of this article 1.3, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole specified in subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section.
(D) The mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section shall commence immediately upon the discharge of an offender from imprisonment in the custody of the department of corrections. If the offender has been granted release to parole supervision by the state board of parole, the offender shall be deemed to have discharged the offender’s sentence to imprisonment provided for in subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section in the same manner as if such sentence were discharged pursuant to law; except that the sentence to imprisonment for any person sentenced as a sex offender pursuant to part 10 of this article 1.3 shall not be deemed discharged on release of said person on parole. When an offender is released by the state board of parole or released because the offender’s sentence was discharged pursuant to law, the mandatory period of parole shall be served by such offender. An offender sentenced for nonviolent felony offenses, as defined in section 17-22.5-405 (5), may receive earned time pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, while serving a mandatory parole period in accordance with this section, but not while such offender is reincarcerated after a revocation of the mandatory period of parole. An offender who is sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, and paroled on or after January 1, 2009, shall be eligible to receive any earned time while on parole or after reparole following a parole revocation. The offender shall not be eligible for earned time while the offender is reincarcerated after revocation of the mandatory period of parole pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(V).
(E) If an offender is sentenced consecutively for the commission of two or more felony offenses pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, the mandatory period of parole for such offender shall be the mandatory period of parole established for the highest class felony of which such offender has been convicted.
(VI) Any person sentenced for a class 2, 3, 4, or 5 felony, or a class 6 felony that is the offender’s second or subsequent felony offense, committed on or after July 1, 1998, regardless of the length of the person’s sentence to incarceration and the mandatory period of parole, shall not be deemed to have fully discharged his or her sentence until said person has either completed or been discharged by the state board of parole from the mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (a).(b)
(I) Except as provided in subsection (6) and subsection (8) of this section and in section 18-1.3-804, a person who has been convicted of a class 2, class 3, class 4, class 5, or class 6 felony shall be punished by the imposition of a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1). In imposing the sentence within the presumptive range, the court shall consider the nature and elements of the offense, the character and record of the offender, and all aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. The prediction of the potential for future criminality by a particular defendant, unless based on prior criminal conduct, shall not be considered in determining the length of sentence to be imposed.
(II) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, a person may be sentenced to imprisonment as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) or to pay a fine that is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) or to both such fine and imprisonment; except that any person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced shall not be eligible to receive a fine in lieu of any sentence to imprisonment as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) but shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentence specified in subparagraph (V) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and may receive a fine in addition to said sentence.
(II.5) Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, any person sentenced for a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5), committed on or after November 1, 1998, may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to, but not instead of, a sentence for imprisonment or probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-1004.
(III) Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, as to any person sentenced for a crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406, committed on or after July 1, 1985, a person may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to, but not instead of, a sentence for imprisonment.
(IV) If a person is convicted of assault in the first degree pursuant to section 18-3-202 or assault in the second degree pursuant to section 18-3-203 (1)(c.5), and the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider engaged in the performance of his or her duties, as defined in section 18-1.3-501 (1.5)(b), notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), the court shall sentence the person to the department of corrections. In addition to a term of imprisonment, the court may impose a fine on the person pursuant to subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1).
(c) Except as otherwise provided by statute, felonies are punishable by imprisonment in any correctional facility under the supervision of the executive director of the department of corrections. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in part 8 of this article to increase sentences for habitual criminals. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in parts 9 and 10 of this article to sentence sex offenders to the department of corrections or to sentence sex offenders to probation for an indeterminate term. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in section 18-1.3-804 for increased sentences for habitual burglary offenders.
(2) (a) A corporation which has been found guilty of a class 2 or class 3 felony shall be subject to imposition of a fine of not less than five thousand dollars nor more thanfifty thousand dollars. A corporation which has been found guilty of a class 4, class 5, or class 6 felony shall be subject to imposition of a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than thirty thousand dollars.
(b) A corporation which has been found guilty of a class 2, class 3, class 4, class 5, or class 6 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1985, shall be subject to imposition of a fine which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Every person convicted of a felony, whether defined as such within or outside this code, shall be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the laws of this state or from practicing as an attorney in any of the courts of this state during the actual time of confinement or commitment to imprisonment or release from actual confinement on conditions of probation. Upon his or her discharge after completion of service of his or her sentence or after service under probation, the right to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit shall be restored, except as provided in section 4 of article XII of the state constitution.
(4) (a) A person who has been convicted of a class 1 felony shall be punished by life imprisonment in the department of corrections unless a proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 18-1.3-1201, 18-1.3-1302, or 18-1.4-102, results in a verdict that requires imposition of the death penalty, in which event such person shall be sentenced to death. As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1985, and before July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole for forty calendar years. As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole.(b)
(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (A) of subparagraph (V) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (4), as to a person who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony following direct filing of an information or indictment in the district court pursuant to section 19-2-517, C.R.S., or transfer of proceedings to the district court pursuant to section 19-2-518, C.R.S., the district court judge shall sentence the person to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a period of forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S. Regardless of whether the state board of parole releases the person on parole, the person shall remain in the legal custody of the department of corrections for the remainder of the person’s life and shall not be discharged.
(II) The provisions of this paragraph (b) shall apply to persons sentenced for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2006.
(c) (I) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (A) of subparagraph (V) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (4), as to a person who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony following a direct filing of an information or indictment in the district court pursuant to section 19-2-517, C.R.S., or transfer of proceedings to the district court pursuant to section 19-2-518, C.R.S., or pursuant to either of these sections as they existed prior to their repeal and reenactment, with amendments, by House Bill 96-1005, which felony was committed on or after July 1, 1990, and before July 1, 2006, and who received a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole:
(A) If the felony for which the person was convicted is murder in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-102 (1)(b), then the district court, after holding a hearing, may sentence the person to a determinate sentence within the range of thirty to fifty years in prison, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S., if, after considering the factors described in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c), the district court finds extraordinary mitigating circumstances. Alternatively, the court may sentence the person to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S.
(B) If the felony for which the person was convicted is not murder in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-102 (1)(b), then the district court shall sentence the person to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S.(II) In determining whether extraordinary mitigating circumstances exist, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing, make factual findings to support its decision, and consider relevant evidence presented by either party regarding the following factors:
(A) The diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change associated with youth;
(B) The offender’s developmental maturity and chronological age at the time of the offense and the hallmark features of such age, including but not limited to immaturity, impetuosity, and inability to appreciate risks and consequences;
(C) The offender’s capacity for change and potential for rehabilitation, including any evidence of the offender’s efforts toward, or amenability to, rehabilitation;
(D) The impact of the offense upon any victim or victim’s immediate family; and
(E) Any other factors that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies such factors on the record.
(III) If a person is sentenced to a determinate range of thirty to fifty years in prison pursuant to this paragraph (c), the court shall impose a mandatory period of ten years parole.
(IV) If a person is sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S., regardless of whether the state board of parole releases the person on parole, the person shall remain in the legal custody of the department of corrections for the remainder of his or her life and shall not be discharged.
(5) In the event the death penalty as provided for in this section is held to be unconstitutional by the Colorado supreme court or the United States supreme court, a person convicted of a crime punishable by death under the laws of this state shall be punished by life imprisonment. In such circumstance, the court which previously sentenced a person to death shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to life imprisonment.
(6) In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subsection (1) of this section unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the sentencing hearing and the presentence report, and support a different sentence which better serves the purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in section 18-1-102.5. If the court finds such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which is lesser or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the offense.
(7) In all cases, except as provided in subsection (8) of this section, in which a sentence which is not within the presumptive range is imposed, the court shall make specific findings on the record of the case, detailing the specific extraordinary circumstances which constitute the reasons for varying from the presumptive sentence.
(8) (a) The presence of any one or more of the following extraordinary aggravating circumstances shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of a felony:
(I) The defendant is convicted of a crime of violence under section 18-1.3-406;
(II) The defendant was on parole for another felony at the time of commission of the felony;
(III) The defendant was on probation or was on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for another felony at the time of the commission of the felony;
(IV) The defendant was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution for another felony at the time of the commission of a felony;
(V) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on appeal bond following his or her conviction for a previous felony;
(VI) At the time of the commission of a felony, the defendant was on probation for or on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult.
(b) In any case in which one or more of the extraordinary aggravating circumstances provided for in paragraph (a) of this subsection (8) exist, the provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall not apply.
(c) Nothing in this subsection (8) shall preclude the court from considering aggravating circumstances other than those stated in paragraph (a) of this subsection (8) as the basis for sentencing the defendant to a term greater than the presumptive range for the felony.
(d)
(I) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 or the class 3 felony of child abuse under section 18-6-401 (7)(a)(I) or (7)(a)(III), the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class felony.
(II) In no case shall any defendant sentenced pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d) be eligible for suspension of sentence or for probation or deferred prosecution.
(e)
(I) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 felony of sexual assault in the first degree under section 18-3-402 (3), commission of which offense occurs prior to November 1, 1998, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class of felony.
(II) In no case shall any defendant sentenced pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (e) be eligible for suspension of sentence or probation.
(III) As a condition of parole under section 17-2-201 (5)(e), C.R.S., a defendant sentenced pursuant to this paragraph (e) shall be required to participate in a program of mental health counseling or receive appropriate treatment to the extent that the state board of parole deems appropriate to effectuate the successful reintegration of the defendant into the community while recognizing the need for public safety.
(e.5) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 felony of sexual assault under section 18-3-402 (5) or the class 2 felony of sexual assault in the first degree under section 18-3-402 (3) as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, commission of which offense occurs on or after November 1, 1998, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for an indeterminate sentence of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class of felony up to the defendant’s natural life.
(f) The court may consider aggravating circumstances such as serious bodily injury caused to the victim or the use of a weapon in the commission of a crime, notwithstanding the fact that such factors constitute elements of the offense.
(g) If the defendant is convicted of class 4 or class 3 felony vehicular homicide under section 18-3-106 (1)(a) or (1)(b), and while committing vehicular homicide the defendant was in immediate flight from the commission of another felony, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the class of felony vehicular homicide of which the defendant is convicted.
(9) The presence of any one or more of the following sentence-enhancing circumstances shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the minimum in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of a felony:
(a) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was charged with or was on bond for a felony in a previous case and the defendant was convicted of any felony in the previous case;
(a.5) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was charged with or was on bond for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;
(b) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on bond for having pled guilty to a lesser offense when the original offense charged was a felony;
(c) The defendant was under a deferred judgment and sentence for another felony at the time of the commission of the felony;
(c.5) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on bond in a juvenile prosecution under title 19, C.R.S., for having pled guilty to a lesser delinquent act when the original delinquent act charged would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;
(c.7) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was under a deferred judgment and sentence for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;
(d) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on parole for having been adjudicated a delinquent child for an offense which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult.
(10) (a) The general assembly hereby finds that certain crimes which are listed in paragraph (b) of this subsection (10) present an extraordinary risk of harm to society and therefore, in the interest of public safety, for such crimes which constitute class 3 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range shall be increased by four years; for such crimes which constitute class 4 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range shall be increased by two years; for such crimes which constitute class 5 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range shall be increased by one year; for such crimes which constitute class 6 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range shall be increased by six months.(b) Crimes that present an extraordinary risk of harm to society shall include the following:
(I) to (VIII) Repealed.
(IX) Aggravated robbery, as defined in section 18-4-302;
(X) Child abuse, as defined in section 18-6-401;
(XI) Unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale, or possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, distribute, manufacture, or dispense, as defined in section 18-18-405;
(XII) Any crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406;
(XIII) Stalking, as described in section 18-9-111 (4), as it existed prior to August 11, 2010, or section 18-3-602;
(XIV) Sale or distribution of materials to manufacture controlled substances, as described in section 18-18-412.7;
(XV) Felony invasion of privacy for sexual gratification, as described in section 18-3-405.6;
(XVI) A class 3 felony offense of human trafficking for involuntary servitude, as described in section 18-3-503;
(XVII) A class 3 felony offense of human trafficking for sexual servitude, as described in section 18-3-504; and
(XVIII) Assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-203 (1)(i).
(c) Repealed.
(11) When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be best served thereby, the court shall have the power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; except that in no instance shall the court have the power to suspend a sentence to a term of incarceration when the defendant is sentenced pursuant to a sentencing provision that requires incarceration or imprisonment in the department of corrections, community corrections, or jail. In no instance shall a sentence be suspended if the defendant is ineligible for probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-201, except upon an express waiver being made by the sentencing court regarding a particular defendant upon recommendation of the district attorney and approval of such recommendation by an order of the sentencing court pursuant to section 18-1.3-201 (4).
(12) Every sentence entered under this section shall include consideration of restitution as required by part 6 of this article and by article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S.
(13) (a) The court, if it sentences a defendant who is convicted of any one or more of the offenses specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (13) to incarceration, shall sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint, but not more than twice the maximum, of the presumptive range authorized for the punishment of the offense of which the defendant is convicted if the court makes the following findings on the record:
(I) The victim ofthe offense was pregnant at the time of commission of the offense; and
(II) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was pregnant.
(III) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 2163, § 3, effective July 1, 2003.)(b) The provisions of this subsection (13) shall apply to the following offenses:
(I) Murder in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-103;
(II) Manslaughter, as described in section 18-3-104;
(III) Criminally negligent homicide, as described in section 18-3-105;
(IV) Vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106;
(V) Assault in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-202;
(VI) Assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-203;
(VII) Vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (13) to the contrary, for any of the offenses specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (13) that constitute crimes of violence, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406.
(14) The court may sentence a defendant to the youthful offender system created in section 18-1.3-407 if the defendant is an eligible young adult offender pursuant to section 18-1.3-407.5
What You Can Do
Let your elected officials know that enough is enough.
Together we can and will bring these perpetrators to justice.
Read The Brief
For many years, most prosecutors charged only those drug-related deaths involving rival drug gang fights as being homicides. But the focus has now broadened to also examine overdose deaths as prosecutable homicides against those who sold and distributed the drugs causing the overdose. It is important to emphasize that not every death because of a drug overdose is a criminal matter. Some are suicides, and some are simply accidents. But some deaths, legally and ethically, may rise to the level of criminal homicide. These homicides may not be easily discovered, investigated, prosecuted or proven, but they still deserve attention. For that to happen, a paradigm shift in thinking by law enforcement officers and prosecutors is required, away from attitudes focusing on accident to thinking and treating overdoses as homicides.
In order to make that shift, it is important to understand and appreciate the variety of approaches available within existing statutory schemes and case law. While a handful of states have no statutory or case law basis for treating overdose deaths as homicides,[8] the majority already had or have adopted a wide variety of legal theories useful in addressing these cases. Two basic options highlight the differing approaches: use of the existing statutory structure, often referred to as the felony murder rule, and creation of a specific offense of death resulting from the distribution of controlled substances.
What might be characterized as the traditional approach to the matter may be found in those states that have included overdose deaths within their murder statute. Arizona and Oklahoma, among others, list drug offenses as crimes which, when a death occurs during the commission of that offense, is treated as murder.[9] A significant number of states enumerate drug offenses within their murder statutes and, while the laws have been on the books for a considerable time, they are only now being considered for use in overdose cases.
A felony murder statute allows the prosecutor to charge an offense which requires no specific mental state other than that required for the enumerated offense;[10] the law may specifically state that no proof of intent to cause the death is required.[11] In general, proof of the underlying offense and the cause of death will be sufficient to obtain a conviction under this approach. Additional elements, such as proof that the underlying felony must be inherently dangerous to human life,[12] or proof of recklessness in both causation and appreciation or awareness of the risk,[13] may be required in some states.
Where these various felony murder states differ is in their classifications for punishment for the offense. The possibilities range from first degree or capital murder,[14] second degree murder,[15] manslaughter,[16] involuntary manslaughter,[17] and even negligent homicide.[18] They may also limit the application of the statute. For example, Florida’s statute applies only to distribution by an adult,[19] while Colorado’s statute applies only to distribution to a minor on school grounds.[20]
Those states punishing drug dealing resulting in death as a specific offense have adopted a variety of approaches as well. These “drug-induced homicide” statutes are crafted as stand-alone felonies rather than being included in existing murder or other statutes. Again, as with the felony murder alternatives, the treatment of punishment and application may vary. New Hampshire and New Jersey both define the offense as being one of strict liability.[21] Both statutes, mirroring one another, apply to methamphetamine, lysergic acid, diethylamide phencyclidine (PCP), or any other Schedule I and II controlled substances and provides that any person who manufactures, sells, or dispenses the substances in violation of law is strictly liable for a death resulting from their use.
The varieties of these statutes are numerous and diverse. Pennsylvania’s statute applies to any controlled substance and provides that the delivery must be done intentionally.[22] Delaware has imposed a minimum weight threshold to its statute, requiring, for example, that there be delivery of at least one gram or more of heroin.[23] Michigan’s law covers Schedule I and II controlled substances, but specifically excludes marijuana.[24] A recent amendment to the Illinois law allows for prosecution for a death within the state caused by a drug that was delivered outside the state in violation of the law of that other jurisdiction.[25]
For those states, such as California, which have no felony murder or drug-induced homicide statute that would apply to overdose situations, prosecutors are left to cobble together a criminal liability theory using a second degree murder or manslaughter charge with a negligence or reckless element. California might make use of its involuntary manslaughter statute.[26] New York might make use of its statutes regarding criminally negligent homicide (criminal negligence standard) or manslaughter in the second degree (reckless standard).[27] A bill to amend Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute to include causing or contributing to the death of a person as a result of the sale, delivery, or administration of a controlled substance and making it a strict liability offense was introduced but has languished since 2016.[28]
Regardless of the criminal statute scheme, one element is the lynchpin to the crime: causation. Whether a felony murder, strict liability, or reckless or negligent theory, causation raises perhaps the most difficult issues in proving these cases.
Overdose cases have a number of matters that may cause the prosecutor some concern, from lack of sympathy for the victim to proving who provided the drugs. On top of these, many of the victims in overdose death cases are polysubstance abusers, injecting or ingesting a wide variety of both legal and illegal substances. Further, because of their drug addictions, their overall general health may be compromised, making them susceptible to diseases and conditions which might impact the situation leading to their deaths. It becomes imperative for the prosecutor to understand what is needed to prove regarding causation.
States have enumerated a variety of different legal standards for causation of death; “direct result,” “caused by,” “proximately caused,” and “results from” being the more common. Also included are “recklessly causes” and “more likely than not.” Each standard has its own legal ramification. It is important to note, however, that the analysis of proximate causation in tort law is quite different from that analysis applied in criminal law. Mere negligence may suffice in a personal injury case, but not in a criminal matter where gross or wanton disregard is needed to show criminal negligence.
In those states making use of a result-oriented scheme, states may follow the reasoning set forth in the leading federal case on the issue, Burrage v United States.[29] Burrage was prosecuted under the provisions of 21 U. S. C. § 841(b) (1) (C) which provides for punishment in the event that “death or serious bodily injury result[ed] from the use of [the drug].” In Burrage, long-time drug user Banka died following an extended binge that included using heroin purchased from Burrage. At trial, medical experts testified that Bank might have died even if he had not taken the heroin Burrage provided. Denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court instructed the jury that the government only had to prove that heroin was a contributing cause of death. The U.S. Supreme Court looked at both actual and proximate cause, holding that, at least where the use of the drug distributed by Burrage was not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death, he could not be held liable unless such use is a “but-for” cause of death. Thus, under Burrage, a particular drug causing a contributory effect to death is not sufficient to create criminal liability.
This narrow approach to causation makes it especially important that the medical examiner and toxicologist both be consulted prior to initiating a prosecution. Beyond the issue of whether the death is an accident versus a homicide, the medical examiner and toxicologist must understand the legal requirements and what ultimately may be asked of them during testimony in homicide prosecutions such as these. The prosecutor must also understand the distinctions and potential nuances in the medical examiner’s stated cause of death.
Even under a felony murder scheme, often seen as a strict liability situation, causation may still be required. For example, the sole act of selling heroin to a purchaser, who, voluntarily and out of the presence and without the assistance of the seller, subsequently injected heroin and died as a result, may be insufficient to invoke the felony murder rule. In order to convict of felony-murder, it may be necessary in some jurisdictions to show that the conduct causing the death was done while in the commission of a felony or in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.[30] Thus, if the commission of the felony is completed upon the sale, a felony murder charge cannot stand. Nor may the result causation element be ignored even in the strict liability situations. These statutes may still contain a result oriented causation requirement.[31]
Thus, even when not specifically enumerated in the statute, causation remains an essential element. For example, where manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance is the underlying felony relied upon in a felony murder prosecution, the state might still be required to prove (1) the commission or attempt to commit the felony; (2) the defendant’s participation in such felony; and (3) the death of the victim as a result of injuries received during the course of the commission or attempt.[32] Furthermore, the cause of death might not necessarily be the sole cause of death.[33] And where the medical examiner has found that the ingestion of the drug was not the sole cause of death, the prosecutor will face an additional legal hurdle. Thus, in order to make the shift to treating overdose deaths as homicides, it is imperative that investigators and prosecutors find not only the correct legal scheme under which to proceed, but also be mindful of the causation element embedded in a statute or required by a jurisdiction’s case law.
Prosecuting overdose deaths as homicides will not be the silver bullet to the public health crisis this nation faces. However, it is one tool in the law enforcement arsenal which, if used appropriately, can assist locally in focusing on the drug dealers who take advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids.
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Understanding Drug Homicide Law
From the Attorney General's point of view.
Read the Brief
For many years, most prosecutors charged only those drug-related deaths involving rival drug gang fights as being homicides. But the focus has now broadened to also examine overdose deaths as prosecutable homicides against those who sold and distributed the drugs causing the overdose. It is important to emphasize that not every death because of a drug overdose is a criminal matter. Some are suicides, and some are simply accidents. But some deaths, legally and ethically, may rise to the level of criminal homicide. These homicides may not be easily discovered, investigated, prosecuted or proven, but they still deserve attention. For that to happen, a paradigm shift in thinking by law enforcement officers and prosecutors is required, away from attitudes focusing on accident to thinking and treating overdoses as homicides.
In order to make that shift, it is important to understand and appreciate the variety of approaches available within existing statutory schemes and case law. While a handful of states have no statutory or case law basis for treating overdose deaths as homicides,[8] the majority already had or have adopted a wide variety of legal theories useful in addressing these cases. Two basic options highlight the differing approaches: use of the existing statutory structure, often referred to as the felony murder rule, and creation of a specific offense of death resulting from the distribution of controlled substances.
What might be characterized as the traditional approach to the matter may be found in those states that have included overdose deaths within their murder statute. Arizona and Oklahoma, among others, list drug offenses as crimes which, when a death occurs during the commission of that offense, is treated as murder.[9] A significant number of states enumerate drug offenses within their murder statutes and, while the laws have been on the books for a considerable time, they are only now being considered for use in overdose cases.
A felony murder statute allows the prosecutor to charge an offense which requires no specific mental state other than that required for the enumerated offense;[10] the law may specifically state that no proof of intent to cause the death is required.[11] In general, proof of the underlying offense and the cause of death will be sufficient to obtain a conviction under this approach. Additional elements, such as proof that the underlying felony must be inherently dangerous to human life,[12] or proof of recklessness in both causation and appreciation or awareness of the risk,[13] may be required in some states.
Where these various felony murder states differ is in their classifications for punishment for the offense. The possibilities range from first degree or capital murder,[14] second degree murder,[15] manslaughter,[16] involuntary manslaughter,[17] and even negligent homicide.[18] They may also limit the application of the statute. For example, Florida’s statute applies only to distribution by an adult,[19] while Colorado’s statute applies only to distribution to a minor on school grounds.[20]
Those states punishing drug dealing resulting in death as a specific offense have adopted a variety of approaches as well. These “drug-induced homicide” statutes are crafted as stand-alone felonies rather than being included in existing murder or other statutes. Again, as with the felony murder alternatives, the treatment of punishment and application may vary. New Hampshire and New Jersey both define the offense as being one of strict liability.[21] Both statutes, mirroring one another, apply to methamphetamine, lysergic acid, diethylamide phencyclidine (PCP), or any other Schedule I and II controlled substances and provides that any person who manufactures, sells, or dispenses the substances in violation of law is strictly liable for a death resulting from their use.
The varieties of these statutes are numerous and diverse. Pennsylvania’s statute applies to any controlled substance and provides that the delivery must be done intentionally.[22] Delaware has imposed a minimum weight threshold to its statute, requiring, for example, that there be delivery of at least one gram or more of heroin.[23] Michigan’s law covers Schedule I and II controlled substances, but specifically excludes marijuana.[24] A recent amendment to the Illinois law allows for prosecution for a death within the state caused by a drug that was delivered outside the state in violation of the law of that other jurisdiction.[25]
For those states, such as California, which have no felony murder or drug-induced homicide statute that would apply to overdose situations, prosecutors are left to cobble together a criminal liability theory using a second degree murder or manslaughter charge with a negligence or reckless element. California might make use of its involuntary manslaughter statute.[26] New York might make use of its statutes regarding criminally negligent homicide (criminal negligence standard) or manslaughter in the second degree (reckless standard).[27] A bill to amend Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute to include causing or contributing to the death of a person as a result of the sale, delivery, or administration of a controlled substance and making it a strict liability offense was introduced but has languished since 2016.[28]
Regardless of the criminal statute scheme, one element is the lynchpin to the crime: causation. Whether a felony murder, strict liability, or reckless or negligent theory, causation raises perhaps the most difficult issues in proving these cases.
Overdose cases have a number of matters that may cause the prosecutor some concern, from lack of sympathy for the victim to proving who provided the drugs. On top of these, many of the victims in overdose death cases are polysubstance abusers, injecting or ingesting a wide variety of both legal and illegal substances. Further, because of their drug addictions, their overall general health may be compromised, making them susceptible to diseases and conditions which might impact the situation leading to their deaths. It becomes imperative for the prosecutor to understand what is needed to prove regarding causation.
States have enumerated a variety of different legal standards for causation of death; “direct result,” “caused by,” “proximately caused,” and “results from” being the more common. Also included are “recklessly causes” and “more likely than not.” Each standard has its own legal ramification. It is important to note, however, that the analysis of proximate causation in tort law is quite different from that analysis applied in criminal law. Mere negligence may suffice in a personal injury case, but not in a criminal matter where gross or wanton disregard is needed to show criminal negligence.
In those states making use of a result-oriented scheme, states may follow the reasoning set forth in the leading federal case on the issue, Burrage v United States.[29] Burrage was prosecuted under the provisions of 21 U. S. C. § 841(b) (1) (C) which provides for punishment in the event that “death or serious bodily injury result[ed] from the use of [the drug].” In Burrage, long-time drug user Banka died following an extended binge that included using heroin purchased from Burrage. At trial, medical experts testified that Bank might have died even if he had not taken the heroin Burrage provided. Denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court instructed the jury that the government only had to prove that heroin was a contributing cause of death. The U.S. Supreme Court looked at both actual and proximate cause, holding that, at least where the use of the drug distributed by Burrage was not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death, he could not be held liable unless such use is a “but-for” cause of death. Thus, under Burrage, a particular drug causing a contributory effect to death is not sufficient to create criminal liability.
This narrow approach to causation makes it especially important that the medical examiner and toxicologist both be consulted prior to initiating a prosecution. Beyond the issue of whether the death is an accident versus a homicide, the medical examiner and toxicologist must understand the legal requirements and what ultimately may be asked of them during testimony in homicide prosecutions such as these. The prosecutor must also understand the distinctions and potential nuances in the medical examiner’s stated cause of death.
Even under a felony murder scheme, often seen as a strict liability situation, causation may still be required. For example, the sole act of selling heroin to a purchaser, who, voluntarily and out of the presence and without the assistance of the seller, subsequently injected heroin and died as a result, may be insufficient to invoke the felony murder rule. In order to convict of felony-murder, it may be necessary in some jurisdictions to show that the conduct causing the death was done while in the commission of a felony or in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.[30] Thus, if the commission of the felony is completed upon the sale, a felony murder charge cannot stand. Nor may the result causation element be ignored even in the strict liability situations. These statutes may still contain a result oriented causation requirement.[31]
Thus, even when not specifically enumerated in the statute, causation remains an essential element. For example, where manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance is the underlying felony relied upon in a felony murder prosecution, the state might still be required to prove (1) the commission or attempt to commit the felony; (2) the defendant’s participation in such felony; and (3) the death of the victim as a result of injuries received during the course of the commission or attempt.[32] Furthermore, the cause of death might not necessarily be the sole cause of death.[33] And where the medical examiner has found that the ingestion of the drug was not the sole cause of death, the prosecutor will face an additional legal hurdle. Thus, in order to make the shift to treating overdose deaths as homicides, it is imperative that investigators and prosecutors find not only the correct legal scheme under which to proceed, but also be mindful of the causation element embedded in a statute or required by a jurisdiction’s case law.
Prosecuting overdose deaths as homicides will not be the silver bullet to the public health crisis this nation faces. However, it is one tool in the law enforcement arsenal which, if used appropriately, can assist locally in focusing on the drug dealers who take advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids.
Sources and Works Cited
[1] Ctrs. for Disease Control, Provisional Counts of Drug Overdose Deaths
[3] The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years
[4] The Heroin Epidemic: Then and Now
[5] Heroin Use Rises Significantly Among Young Whites
[6] Why Fentanyl Is So Much More Deadly than Heroin
[7] Counterfeit Prescription Pills Containing Fentanyl: A Global Threat, DEA Intell. Brief
[8] The offense of trafficking a controlled substance by possession with intent to distribute cannot be the predicate felony to a felony murder conviction because it is not an inherently dangerous crime. State v. Bankert, 117 N.M. 614, 975 P.2d 370 (1994).
[9] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105 and 21 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 21-701/7.
[10] Alaska Stat. § 11.41.120.
[11] Minn. Stat. § 609.195.
[12] Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1.
[13] Iowa Code § 707.5.
[14] See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1.
[15] La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.021.
[16] Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 265, § 13.
[17] Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.070.
[18] Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-104.
[19] Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1(a)3.
[20] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102(e).
[21] N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 318-B:26; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-9.
[22] Tit. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2506.
[23] Del. Code Ann .tit 16 § 4752B.
[24] Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.317a.
[25] 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-3.3.
[26] Cal. Penal Code § 192.
[27] N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.10, 125.15.
[28] H.B. 141, 132nd General Assembly.
[29] 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).
[30] See State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956, 529 P.2d 124 (1974)
[31] N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-9
[32] See., e.g., State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983)
[33] See State v. Jenkins, 229 W.Va. 415, 729 S.E.2d 250 (2012)